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“The engagement of ﬁrms in corrupt acts, among them-
selves and with government ofﬁcials, is perhaps the princi-
pal threat to continued social support for private businesses.”
(Collins, Uhlenbruck, & Rodriguez, 2009, p. 89)
Human greed has been present, perhaps, since the very
existence of humans itself and has led to many forms of cor-
ruption and fraud. While individual corruption, cheating, and
unethical behaviour have been the subject of intellectual cu-
riosity for a long time now, corporate corruption and fraud
have become areas of inquiry, mostly in the last couple of
decades. This is because large-scale corporate frauds and mis-
demeanors have come to the surface more recently, and these
have not just affected shareholders’ wealth but in many cases,
have caused loss of human lives as well. Robin Banerjee pro-
vides myriads of such examples of corporate fraud in the book
“Who Cheats and How? Scams, Fraud and the Dark Side of the
Corporate World”. The book covers many different kinds of
cheating and fraud that are taking place in the business world
around the globe and is very useful for readers interested in
the entire spectrum of corporate fraud. The book serves as
an eye opener as it presents the readers with examples of cor-
porate fraud from many companies they might be familiar
with, even some very respectable ones! What comes across
as most interesting is that many companies ﬁnd themselves
on both sides of the fraud; sometimes they cheat and at other
times they are the victims of cheating.
According to the evidence presented by Banerjee, it can
be safely accepted that fraud/ corruption/cheating are wide-
spread in the business world, and they happen in many dif-
ferent ways. In that sense, the book does an excellent job
of answering the “how” part of the problem. However, at a
broader level, the “who” remains unanswered. Is it the in-
dividual executive whose greed gets the better of him or her,
leading to fraud, or is the corporation as a whole respon-
sible? Similarly, the “why” is also an important question to
be raised, given the possibility of damage to the reputation
of corporations and of criminal cases against them.
Banerjee answers the “why” question by stating that cheat-
ing is “irresistible” to some people. He further elaborates on
other possible reasons for cheating such as short-cut to
success, others do it too, no oversight, and habit! While all
of these are different cases that reﬂect complex human
behaviour, their scientiﬁc investigation needs to be based on
a coherent typology. For example, if we consider execu-
tives as “rational economic actors” who are motivated by self-
interest, then they could be assumed to indulge in fraudulent
activities when the payoffs are more than the potential costs
(Ostas, 2007 p. 575), such as loss of personal and profes-
sional reputation and criminal prosecution. However, from
the point of view of behavioural economics, executives’
behaviour could also be characterised as being boundedly ra-
tional (Simon, 1972), leading to cognitive limitations in evalu-
ating the costs and beneﬁts of fraud. Moreover, in particular
cases of fraud, the choices are tough to evaluate, given their
different time frames and the probability of each action on
the cost side. Extending this reasoning further, in case of am-
biguity of choice between whether to opt for fraudulent ac-
tivities or not, taking into account prospect theory (Kahneman
& Tversky, 1979) and its predictions about loss avoidance, one
could predict that executives would, more often than not,
decide not to opt for it. It would have been interesting, had
Banerjee addressed the question of whether and how the cost
side of decision on fraudulent activities needs to be in-
creased to reduce instances of such fraudulent practices.
With regard to the other and more important actors of
fraud, corporations, Banerjee asks—Can a company cheat?
While the motive of an executive indulging in fraud is difﬁ-
cult to understand, the same about a corporate is even harder
to explain, especially the ones that are very successful, proﬁt
making and reputed. Banerjee goes up a level in this task—by
deﬁning the corporations ﬁrst, legally and socially. He makes
a valid point that corporations are mini-societies consisting
of people. But society is also not a homogenous set. Societ-
ies differ in their culture, values, beliefs and practices. And
so do corporate values, and corruption or fraud therein.
Institution-wide differences might play a signiﬁcant role
despite the fact that most kinds of unethical activities are
illegal in almost all countries. However, societal norms and
acceptance of corrupt practices may vary signiﬁcantly. A par-
ticular type of corrupt practice, bribing for example, despite
being illegal everywhere, may be considered “a way to get
things done” in many societies especially in developing econo-
mies. In these societies, the possibilities of corrupt prac-
tices are higher. Similarly, often the corrupt practices may
be a response to government corruption (Galang, 2012), and
corporations and their executives rationalise corrupt practices
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as the routine way to get things done (Collins et al., 2009).
Some discussion on societal and institutional differences in
corrupt practices might have added to the book’s value for
the reader.
So who should be held responsible when corporates indulge
in fraud—shareholders (who are owners) or the manage-
ment (who are decision makers)? If it is the management, is
it the entire management or particular executives? Why do
ﬁrms that are already doing well indulge in malpractices? Is
management education responsible for this sudden in-
crease in cases of corporate fraud, or have societal values
deteriorated? These are some of the questions Banerjee leaves
the reader to ponder over by providing evidence and
anecdotes.
Banerjee’s objective in this book seems to have been on
creating awareness about corporate cheating and
misdemeanour. He believes that prevention is the best remedy
for the widespread epidemic of corporate corruption. There-
fore, the book touches on almost every possible type of fraud
in the corporate world: accounting fraud to cybercrime,
business–politician nexus to extortion by media, ghost re-
search to the theft of food aid. The author succeeds in his
objective of making the reader aware about the many dif-
ferent ways that corporates cheat. The hypothetical dem-
onstrations (the how of corporate fraud) are a distinctive
feature of the book that are helpful for management stu-
dents and investors alike to understand nuances. The care
taken to make the material accessible to readers who may
not be well-versed in business/accounting terminology is laud-
able. Another feature of the book is the extent of coverage
of accounting related frauds which has imprints of Banerjee’s
expertise in the area of accounting and ﬁnance. Details of
technology-enabled crimes/ cyber-crimes and how they work
are another worthwhile contribution of the book.
However, from an academic or researcher’s perspec-
tive, the breadth of topics and sub-topics on corporate
misdemeanours becomes a weakness. A book focussed on a
few reasons of corporate fraud like analyst pressure, lack of
internal control or poor corporate governance would be more
useful. Alternatively, a classiﬁcation framework could have
aided the reader, apart from avoiding repetition in cases.
Another feature of the book where more clarity is needed is
the role of tailpieces. Sometimes they are just a summary of
preceding cases; sometimes they provide additional infor-
mation; sometimes they become normative in advising the
reader; and sometimes they are laced with witty quotes and
light humour in an otherwise negative subject.
There are a few other areas that could have enhanced the
value of the book. First, it would have been interesting if the
author had built upon the nuances of the deﬁnition of and
the differences between the crimes hementions. For example,
Banerjee begins the book by distinguishing between fraud and
corruption. He asserts that fraud uses “deceit or misrepre-
sentation to obtain an unfair advantage”, while corruption
is the “illegal use of an ofﬁcial position to secure a beneﬁt
through breach of trust” (p. xxvii). He gives an example of
a false signature of the account holder to obtain unfair
payments as a “fraud” and undue favour accorded by gov-
ernment ofﬁcials against unlawful payment as “corrup-
tion”. The picture it presents, though unintended, is that
corporates are involved in fraud while government ofﬁcials
are involved in corruption. He also states that they go “hand
in hand”. It would have been interesting to understand the
distinction between corporate fraud and corporate corrup-
tion enumerated through examples. Second, as detailed as
the work is, a glossary of the terms and kind of crimes would
have been very helpful. Ethical issues in the pharmaceuti-
cal industry are serious, but they could have been better dealt
with in a separate book instead of a small chapter.
On technical aspects, the language of the book is often
colloquial and has some grammar and editing issues. The ﬂow
of ideas is not the best at times, and data sources are not
provided. Chapter 6 is too lengthy, and would have worked
better if split into two or three chapters.
Lastly, Banerjee does not think that cases of scam and fraud
can be eradicated or signiﬁcantly curbed. So, he provides
guidelines and advice, along with abundant examples, for the
reader to be aware of scams, and possibly prevent fraud in
his book, which could have been alternatively titled “Mini-
cases on corporate fraud”.
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